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ABSTRACT
Over the last decade, there has been a rise in cybercrime services offered on a feefor-service basis, enabling individuals to direct attacks against various targets.
One of the recent services offered involves stresser or booter operators,
which offer distributed reflected denial of service (DRDoS) attacks on an hourly
or subscription basis. These attacks involve the use of malicious traffic reflected
off of webservers to increase the volume of traffic, which is directed toward
websites and servers rendering them unusable. Researchers have examined
DRDoS attacks using real-time data, though few have considered the experience
of their customers and the factors associated with the likelihood of successful
attack outcomes. This study examines this issue using a binary logistic regression
analysis of survey responses from a population of stresser clients. The
implications of this study for our understanding of the social factors
underlying cyberattacks is discussed in depth.
Keywords: DRDoS, cybercrime, booter operators, malicious traffic,
logistic regression
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, the landscape of
cybercrime has changed as a result of the
establishment of tools that enable attacks to be
performed on a fee-for-service basis. There are
myriad studies demonstrating the range of
services available in underground cybercrime
markets, ranging from spam email distribution
to malicious software to personal information
and credit card data (Dhanjani & Rios, 2008;
Franklin, Paxson, Perrig, & Savage, 2007;
Herley & Florencio, 2010; Holt, 2013; Holt &
Lampke, 2010; Holz, Engelberth, & Freling,
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2009; Honeynet Research Alliance, 2003;
Motoyama, McCoy, Levchenko, Savage, &
Voelker, 2011; Thomas & Martin, 2006).
Service providers readily earn millions of
dollars selling attack tools or personal
information due to the demand from interested
parties looking to quickly and efficiently target
individuals and corporations alike (Franklin et
al., 2007; Holt, Smirnova, & Chua, 2016; Holz
et al., 2009; Moore, Clayton, & Anderson,
2009).
Research
on
cybercrime
services
demonstrates that they are largely driven by
social relationships between buyers and sellers,
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whether they operate in forums (Holt, 2013;
Holt & Lampke, 2010; Holt et al., 2016;
Motoyama et al., 2011; Yip, Webber &
Shadbolt, 2013), IRC (Franklin et al., 2006;
Honeynet Research Alliance, 2003; Holz et al.,
2009), or on sites hosted on Tor, or the Dark
Web (Li & Chen, 2014; Smirnova & Holt,
2017). Specifically, buyers frequently post
reviews of their experience with a vendor, with
an emphasis on the quality of products relative
to their costs, and the speed with which vendors
respond to queries (e.g., Holt, 2013; Holt &
Lampke, 2010; Hutchings & Holt, 2015). The
tone of feedback has a strong influence on the
perceived reputation of vendors, with negative
feedback minimizing their ability to sell within
a given market (Franklin et al., 2007; Herley &
Florencio, 2010; Holt & Lampke, 2010;
Motoyama et al., 2011). In fact, some forums
offer product testers who actively evaluate the
claims of vendors’ tools or data and post their
reviews to help legitimize quality vendors and
marginalize those offering poor quality goods
(Holt et al., 2016).
The need to purchase functional data and
effective services are somewhat obvious: buyers
seek the greatest value and return on their initial
investment (e.g., Smirnova & Holt, 2017). This
is particularly critical when considering stolen
financial information or malicious software that
acquires sensitive data or provides backdoor
remote access to victim machines. In the event
the data or service does not work, the buyer will
have minimal recourse to recoup their losses.
Other forms of cybercrime-as-service attacks
may not be as dependent upon this dynamic,
particularly if the only goal of the attack is to
shut down access to a resource. This is
frequently the case with so-called "stresser" or
"booter" services that offer distributed reflective
denial of service (DRDoS) attacks for a fee
(Hutchings & Clayton, 2016; Karimi & McCoy,
2013; Rossow & Gurtz, 2014; Santanna,
Rijswijk-Deij, Hofstede, & Sperotto, 2015).
These attacks enable service providers to
perform high- volume Distributed Denial of

Service attacks against web-based targets with
minimal resources, while simultaneously hiding
the origin of the attacks. During an attack, the
target is flooded with more requests than can be
completed in millisecond intervals by using
vulnerable servers and devices such as home
routers to reflect and amplify the volume of
requests during the attacks. Since the target
cannot respond to the attack requests, legitimate
users are also unable to utilize the resource as
well. DRDoS attacks can cost companies
millions of dollars in lost revenue and may
embarrass the victim as well due to perceptions
over their inability to stop the attack (e.g., Arbor
Networks, 2015).
The fee-for-service model of booters and
stressers primarily operate on a subscription
basis, where customers pay for weeks or months
of service during which they can launch attacks
at will (Arbor Networks 2016; Hutchings &
Clayton, 2016; Karimi, Park, & McCoy, 2015;
Rossow & Gortz, 2014; Santanna et al., 2015).
Customers are also given options as to the type
of attack that will be performed on the basis of
specific Internet protocol vulnerabilities that can
be used to send requests. Though the attack type
may vary, the primary outcome of the attack is
the same: keeping others from using a web
server or on-line resource. As a consequence,
booter clients may not be interested in the
accuracy with which an attack takes place, but
whether the service is made unavailable.
Though research examining booters and
stressers has increased (Hutchings & Clayton
2016; Karimi & McCoy, 2013; Karimi et al.,
2015; Rossow & Gortz, 2014; Santanna et al.,
2015), few have considered whether their
customers were satisfied with the service or
achieved their specified goals.
Evidence
suggests that the majority of DRDoS services
are functional, with only a small proportion
either failing or utilizing a different attack
method than what was initially ordered (Karimi
et al., 2015; Santanna et al., 2015). Thus, this
exploratory analysis attempted to identify the
foreground and situational dynamics associated
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with customers’ perceptions of failed attacks
performed by booter and stresser service
providers. Using survey data collected from
individuals who appeared to have purchased
DRDoS service subscriptions, the findings
demonstrate that the practices of vendors have a
greater impact on the likelihood of failure than
those of the customer. The results reinforce the
broader literature on cybercrime as a service,
and the implications of this study for our
understanding of cybercrimiality are considered
in detail.
2. PRIOR RESEARCH ON STRESSORS
AND BOOTERS
The operation of booter and stresser services are
somewhat different from existing DDoS attacks
commonly associated with either botnet
malware (Karimi & McCoy, 2013; Karimi et al.,
2015; Santanna et al., 2015) or stand-alone tools
such as the Low Orbit Ion Cannon associated
with Anonymous (Mansfield-Devine, 2011).
Both DRDoS and DDoS attacks utilize
thousands of connection requests to a targeted
server, launched from multiple IP addresses
every second. Stresser services, however, do
not launch attacks from infected computers as
with botnets. Instead, they utilize powerful
backend servers to “reflect” or amplify the
quantity of traffic to the targeted system through
the use of malformed packets with spoofed IP
addresses (US CERT, 2014).
These backend servers are not controlled
by attackers but are part of existing Internet
service providers’ infrastructure that can be
vulnerable to this form of attack. Certain
network protocols can be hijacked by attackers
as a means to send attack traffic. In fact, fifteen
different network protocols have been used to
reflect and amplify attacks, most of which are
extremely common and used by major websites
(Rossow & Gortz, 2014; US CERT, 2014). The
various protocols available work to an attacker’s
advantage, as stressor operators changed their
attack methods in progress if they are
unsuccessful due to vendors and website
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operators patching known security flaws
(Hutchings & Clayton, 2016).
The flexibility afforded to stresser operators
in terms of attack protocols would suggest they
have a high likelihood of general success
knocking targets off-line. This is supported by
recent research analyzing actual attack traffic
against live targets (Karimi & McCoy, 2013;
Santanna et al., 2015). At the same time, the
information customers need to determine what
booter and stresser operator to work with may
not be readily available as service providers
typically advertise their services via personal
websites (Hutchings & Anderson, 2016).
Unlike with forums and other interactive
cybercrime markets, individual websites allow
operators to control the number of negative
reviews or critical comments over their services
that can be viewed (Hutchings & Anderson,
2016; Smirnova & Holt, 2017).
These
conditions may constrain buyer decisionmaking and lead certain factors associated with
both the vendor and the prospective buyer to be
a strong determinant in whether an attack fails
or succeeds.
To that end, certain characteristics of the
stresser or booter service provider may have
some association to an attack failure. For
instance, some stresser operators offer free
attacks using a small number of common attack
protocols as a means for clients to validate the
seller’s claims (Hutchings & Clayton, 2016).
The same process has been noted in stolen data
markets operating in forums and on-line spaces,
though individuals who offer free data may be
more likely to cheat their customers and provide
no data after receiving payment from the
customer (Herley & Florencio, 2010; Holt et al.,
2016). All stressers do not offer free tests,
suggesting that the availability of testing
services may be associated with a more reliable
stresser operator.
In much the same way, some stresser
operators allow their customers to test their
service at no cost for a set period of minutes to
validate their claims. Tests of data or services
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in traditional cybercrime-as-service markets
appear to be a way to establish a vendor’s
reliability and may be associated with higher
prices for data (Holt, Smirnova & Chua, 2013).
In the event a vendor does not offer a test, the
customer takes a risk that the vendor has
exaggerated their claims. As a result, an
absence of testing services may be more likely
to increase the risk of attack failure.
The ability to communicate with the
vendor should also influence success as research
demonstrates a strong connection between
vendor communications and their overall
reputation in cybercrime-as-service markets
generally (Holt, 2013; Holt & Lampke, 2010;
Yip et al., 2013). Those who are difficult to
contact or are slow to respond may be more
likely to be rip-off artists or simply unconcerned
about the potential for customer feedback to
influence their market position. Booter and
stresser operators may be more open to contact
with their clients due to the potential for attacks
to be launched in different ways to achieve the
same attack objective: elimination of a resource
(Hutchings & Clayton, 2016). If an attack is
successful on its initial launch, the customer has
no need to contact the vendor. Thus, attempts to
contact stresser operators may be a predictor of
failure as the attack may not have worked as
advertised.
A potential customer’s knowledge of
booters and stressers may have a mixed
relationship to the likelihood of a stresser
attack’s success. Individuals with a greater
comprehension of the technical aspects of a
certain form of attack and a service may be
better able to recognize accurate descriptions of
attacks posted by vendors. At the same time, the
availability of tests and free attacks renders the
need for deep technical knowledge moot as
customers can shop across vendors until they
find a provider that works (Franklin et al., 2007;
Holt & Lampke, 2010). Thus, knowledge may
have a limited relationship to attack failure.
The target a customer has identified for
an attack may also have a relationship to the

likelihood of success. Larger organizations and
government resources may be resilient against
web-based DRDoS attacks because of their use
of cloud-based security infrastructure to offload
malicious traffic has decreased the utility of
some forms of DDoS attacks (GrahamCumming, 2014). In recent years, DRDoS
services have also been employed against online gaming servers as a way to target competing
players and knock them off-line during play
(Hutchings & Clayton, 2016; Karami & McCoy,
2013). These targets may be more easily
affected, as could individually be owned or
operated web servers because of variations in
their infrastructure and security configurations.
The motivation of an attacker may also
have some relationship to the success of an
attack.
DDoS attacks have value as an
expressive attack tool, as they may be used for
either economic gain, ideological agendas, or
simply revenge against an opponent or enemy
(Rossow & Gortz, 2014). Individuals seeking to
profit from an attack may be less dependent on
a successful attack and simply on the threat of
an attack taking place in order to profit (Ianelli
& Hackworth, 2005; Segura & Lahuerta, 2010).
Individuals seeking to express an ideological
belief may be more reliant on an attack’s success
in order to communicate their opinion (Denning,
2011; Woo et al., 2004). At the same time, they
may be interested in targeting resources that
have more robust infrastructure and security
tools to withstand an attack of all but the largest
magnitude (Graham-Cumming, 2014). These
attack types may be more likely to fail
depending on the nature of the attack.
Individuals seeking revenge may be more likely
to target game servers or peers, thereby making
them more likely to succeed.
These hypotheses are based on
assumptions about the nature of attackers and
booter/stresser operators, though the research
to-date is limited. As a result, there is a need for
empirical inquiry to address this gap in our
knowledge about the nature of cybercrime-asservice operations. This study attempted to
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examine these issues using a unique
convenience sample of booter and stresser
clientele.
3. DATA AND METHODS
A unique sampling methodology was employed
to develop a sample of stresser clients for this
analysis. While prior studies either hired booter
services to examine attack traffic (e.g. Karimi &
McCoy, 2013; Santanna et al., 2015) or
contacted vendors to conduct interviews
(Hutchings & Clayton, 2016), such strategies do
not provide insights from their customers. We
researchers identified a cracked database of
stresser customers that was posted online,
containing 51,909 unique email addresses. This
provided a robust sample of individuals who
were at least interested in learning more about
stressers, or may have used that specific service
provider.
These email addresses were sent a
message inviting the recipient to participate in
an anonymous online survey to understand
stresser service operations between November
27 and 29, 2016. The email message informed
the respondent that a research study was being
conducted on stressers and booters, the survey
was anonymous, and the information would
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only be used for research purposes. The first
question of the survey was embedded in the
email message and if the respondent answered
the first question, they were directed to the
remainder of the survey on the Survey Monkey
webpage. The survey consisted of 22 multiple
choice questions and one comment box for
follow up requests. The questions related to the
use of stresser and booters and included the
respondent’s skill level, type of payment used,
attack protocols used, targets of attacks,
motivation for usage, and demographics. A
reminder message was sent on December 2,
2016, as a reminder to the complete the survey
which closed on December 30, 2016.
Of the initial sample of messages sent, 5,226
emails were verified as received and opened.
This is sensible given the fact that the database
containing those emails had been posted
publicly and may have included junk email
addresses abandoned by users. Also, the
researchers have no way to validate whether the
addresses belonged to 59,000 individuals, or
involved multiple accounts owned by a single
person. Of those, 821 individuals completed the
survey, and 218 remained due to listwise
deletion. While this is a substantial drop-off in
respondents, it is not outside of expectations for
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (N= 201)
Variable

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Did stresser not work

.233

.424

0

1

Pay to use

.651

.477

0

1

Could you test

.915

.278

0

1

Contact Stresser

.323

.468

0

1

Knowledge

7.611

2.353

1

10

Self

.577

.495

0

1

Game

.502

.501

0

1

Business Server

.263

.441

0

1

Website or Server

.527

.500

0

1

Government Website

.164

.371

0

1

Other

.343

.475

0

1

Research

.482

.500

0

1

System Testing

.592

.492

0

1

Affect Game or Opponent

.427

.496

0

1

Hacktivism

.228

.421

0

1

Affect Business Competitor .114

.319

0

1

Test My Abilities

.499

0

1

Target

Motive

.457

response rates in traditional on-line survey
studies (Curtin, Presser, & Singer, 2005; Fan &
Zan, 2010) and in a population of active
offenders generally. Prior scholarship notes that
individuals engaged in cybercrime are less
likely to participate in research out of concern
for their safety (e.g., Holt, 2007; Hutchings &
Clayton, 2016; Pruitt, 2007). Though the small
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sample limits the generalizability of the data, the
responses provide essential insights into an
under-examined
phenomenon
using
a
convenient yet purposive set of respondents.
Dependent Variable
To understand the extent to which
stresser services worked, respondents were
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asked: “Did the Booter or Stresser work as
advertised?” (0-no; 1-yes). Since the majority
of respondents (75%) claimed the attack they
used was functional, the item was reverse coded
(1=no) to examine the factors associated with
failed attacks (see Table 1 for descriptive
statistics). This issue is of particular interest as
a small proportion of research demonstrates
booter attack methods may fail (Santanna et al.,
2015).
Therefore research is needed to
understand the extent to which attacks appear
successful to the customer, regardless of
whether the attack traffic matched what was
advertised.
Independent variables
Respondents were asked several questions
regarding their experience with the use of a
stressor or booter to identify any factors of the
service may be associated with the likelihood of
failure. The broader research on data markets
and cybercrime as service markets demonstrates
some association between certain vendor
behaviors and greater levels of trust or
reliability. These measures were included to
understand the extent to which they may be
associated with booter and stresser operations.
Specifically, respondents were asked, “Did you
pay a fee to use the booter or stresser” (0=no;
1=yes). This is included as stressers operate at
no cost, and research on other forms of
cybercrime as service that operate on a free basis
may be less likely to be successful (Herley &
Florencio, 2010). Participants were also asked
“Were you able to use the stresser or booter to
test systems?” to understand the relationship
between product testing and functionality
(0=no; 1=yes). Evidence suggests product
testing in data markets may be associated with
greater trust in the vendor (Holt et al., 2016),
thus this variable was included to examine its
ties to booter services. A measure was also
included to understand whether a customer had
to contact the vendor: “Did you ever need to
contact the operator of the booter or stresser for
questions or help?” (0=no; 1=yes).
We
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hypothesize that vendor contact would be
associated with an increased risk of attack
failure as they may need to either 1) report the
attack failed, or 2) seek an explanation as to why
or how the attack did not succeed. Finally, a
measure for customer knowledge was included
as a 10 point scale (1=low; 10=high) to
understand the extent to which more
understanding of booter operations may be
associated with failure.
Six measures were included to examine
the extent to which the target of an RDDoS
attack may be associated with failure.
Specifically, respondents were asked: “What
did you use the stresser/booter on?” with six
response categories: 1) Yourself, 2) Game, 3)
Business Server (non website, such as Email or
File Server), 4) Private/commercial Website /
Webserver, 5) Govt website or web server, and
6) Other. A binary response was used (0=no;
1=yes) to test the hypothesis that certain targets,
such as commercial websites and government
servers may be more resilient to attack rendering
attacks more likely to fail.
Finally, a set of seven measures were
included to examine the relationship between an
actor’s motivation for performing an attack and
their likelihood of failure. Respondents were
asked “What was the motivation behind use of
the booter/stresser?” with seven responses: 1)
research; 2) system testing; 3) affecting
game/game opponent; 4) hacktivism (protest);
5) affect business competitor; 6) test my
abilities; and 7) other. These motivations
correspond to the broader reasons why actors
may employ either booter or stresser services
(Hutchings & Clayton, 2016), or those of the
hacker community generally (Holt & Kilger,
2012). Each item was treated as a binary (0=no;
1=yes) and included to understand whether any
motivation corresponded to the likelihood of a
failed attack.
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4. FINDINGS
To examine any relationship between vendorspecific conditions, attitudes of the individual
customer, and failed attacks, a binary logistic
regression
analysis
was
conducted.
Multicollinearity did not appear to bias the
parameter estimates as the independent
variables were not strongly correlated with one
another. Additionally, the highest VIF was
.508, while the lowest tolerance was 1.980
suggesting no issues with multicollinearity
generally.

All
variables
were
included
simultaneously in a binary logistic regression
model, which found that customers who were
not able to test the stresser’s services were more
likely to report a failed attack, reinforcing the
literature regarding stolen data and cybercrime
as service market vendor reliability (see Table
2; Holt & Lampke, 2010; Holt et al., 2016).
Additionally, customers who contacted the
vendor were more likely to experience failure,
supporting our hypothesis that individuals only
make contact in the event of failure.

Table 2: Binary Logistic Regression Model (N= 201)
Variable
B
S.E.

Exp(B)

Pay to use
Could you test
Contact Stresser
Knowledge

-.370
.233
1.271
-.079

.471
.661
.448
.087

.691
.107**
3.564**
.924

Target
Self
Game
Business Server
Website or Server
Government Website
Other

.044
-.059
.105
.458
-.438
.179

.441
.516
.514
.463
.653
.436

1.045
.943
1.111
1.196
.645
1.196

.530
-.071
.424

.441
.465
.535

1.698
.931
1.528

-1.565
.763

.596
.698

.209**
2.145

-.254
-.121
.812

.413
.538
.814

.755
.886
2.253

Motive
Research
System Testing
Affect Game
or Opponent
Hacktivism
Affect Business
Competitor
Test My Abilities
Other
Constant

Pseudo R2
.234
p=.05*; p=.01**;-2LL = 184.774; χ2(7) = 33.859**
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No significant relationships were
observed between target type and attack failure,
suggesting that the nature of a target has little
influence on resilience or success. With respect
to the motivational measures, only one
significant relationship was present: hacktivism.
The relationship was negative, meaning those
who were not motivated by an ideological or
activist-related agenda were more likely to
report failure. This was unexpected as an
ideologically motivated actor may be more
likely to target a government or industry target
(e.g. Jordan & Taylor, 2004), which may be
more likely to withstand an attack.
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Criminological scholarship examining the
market for personal data and services based
around hacking and cybercrime tools has
increased over the last decade (Franklin et al.,
2007; Holt, 2013; Holt & Lampke, 2010;
Motoyama et al., 2011).
These studies
demonstrate that human factors drive
cybercriminality, particularly reviews of service
providers on the basis of the quality of their
products and services (Holt et al., 2016;
Motoyama et al., 2011). Recent research has
identified the emergence of a new form of feefor-service attack vendors offering DRDoS
attacks, offering paid denial of service attacks
against websites and services that are difficult to
mitigate (Karimi & McCoy, 2013; Karimi et al.,
2015; Santanna et al., 2013). Given that
research has found these attacks to be largely
successful with functionality that corresponds to
what customers may order, it is necessary to
consider what factors may be associated with
failed attacks. This study attempted to address
this issue through an examination of customer
experiences within a population of individuals
who utilized stresser or booter services.
Using a unique survey of DRDoS customers,
the findings demonstrate that failure appears to
be associated with the stresser or booter operator
rather than that of the client. Specifically,
customers who used vendors that did not allow
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tests of their services in advance were more
likely to experience failed attacks. These
findings reflect evidence from prior research on
illicit markets for data and malware as buyers
who can validate a service provider’s claims
prior to making a purchase were more likely to
provide positive reviews and experiences
(Herley & Florencio, 2010; Holt, 2013; Holt et
al., 2016).
Booter or Stresser customers who had to
make contact with a stressor operator were also
more likely to report failed attacks. This finding
supports the hypothesis that contact between
stresser providers may be a sign of failure,
which may partially reinforce the literature on
illicit data markets. Specifically, customers
value the ability to contact vendors so as to
ensure successful use of services or data (e.g.,
Holt, 2013; Holt & Lampke, 2010). Unlike the
purchase of data or malware which may require
customers to have a degree of technical
knowledge, it is likely that DRDoS service
customers may simply want to know why the
attack did not work. This was reinforced by the
fact that knowledge of booter services was nonsignificant in the model. As a result, the role of
contact may be somewhat different compared to
other forms of cybercrime-as-service.
Additionally, this study found only one
association
between
customer
target
preferences, motivations, and the likelihood of
attack failure. Those who were not motivated by
hacktivism were more likely to fail, which is
somewhat surprising given that hacktivists may
be more inclined to target corporate or
government infrastructure (e.g., Denning, 2010;
Jordan & Taylor, 2004). Such resources would
theoretically have greater cybersecurity support
infrastructure at their disposal to mitigate
DRDoS attacks (Graham-Cumming, 2014).
However, the fact that no other motivation was
significant in the model suggests a need for
greater research to disentangle the relationship
between motive, targeting, and successful
attacks (see also Hutchings & Clayton, 2016).
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Taken as a whole, this study suggests that
booter and stresser operations share some
common dynamics to other forms of cybercrime
operating on a fee-for-service basis. Though
DRDoS vendors advertise differently from
stolen data and malware vendors (Hutchings &
Clayton, 2016; Karami & McCoy, 2013;
Karami et al., 2015) the likelihood that
customers have successful experiences with
service providers are driven by the same factors
associated vendor behavior rather than that of
the customer (Holt et al., 2016). These findings
suggest the social factors of cybercrime must be
given equal consideration to those of the
technical aspects of attacks (Franklin et al.,
2007; Holt & Bossler, 2016; Smirnova & Holt,
2017; Yip et al., 2013).
At the same time, the preliminary nature of this
study and its limited generalizability demand
further study to examine the customers’ of
booter and stresser services. Specifically,
researchers could employ qualitative methods
with known customers of service providers to
more fully document how success is defined by
clients (see also Hutchings & Clayton, 2016). In
addition, further study is needed to better define
the targets of booter attacks to understand the
location, employee size, and other conditions
that may affect the likelihood of success.
Finally, research is needed to better document
the extent of customers’ technical proficiency so
as to identify whether booters and stressers are
servicing primarily unskilled actors or a more
diverse population. Such insights would be
essential to understand why and how DRDoS
service providers continue to thrive, as well as
the reasons why individuals may be more
willing to pay for this infrastructure on a feebasis as opposed to building their own for use at
will. Such insights can greatly improve our
understanding of the social dynamics that shape
cybercrime and identify strategies to detect,
mitigate, and defend against these threats.
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